Mali: November 2016 Violence Related to AQIM, Ansar al-Din, MUJWA, and Islamic State Branch in the Sahel

By Rida Lyammouri

January 31, 2017

Full PDF report could be found here:

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Mali: October 2016 Violence Related to AQIM, Ansar al-Din, MUJWA, Islamic State Branch in the Sahel and Other Security Incidents

By Rida Lyammouri

November 16th, 2016

  • There were at least 16 casualties and 21 injuries in violent attacks related to VEOs in Mali in October 2016.
  • Out of 18 attacks MINUSMA forces were targeted 5 times, Malian Army 8 times, Barkhane forces 3 times, 1 civilian vehicle [ambulance at Malian Army checkpoint], and 1 attack rockets were fired on the city of Gao.
  • At least 18 attacks related to VEOs operating in Mali in October 2016. Ansar al-Din officially claimed 7 out of the 18 attacks through its media arm al-Rimah, AQIM claimed 1 attack, and 10 attacks were unclaimed.
  • Ansar al-Din remains the main threat to French, Malian, and MINUSMA forces. Ansar al-Din threat is high and most likely to continue in Kidal Region and in Mopti Region through Macina brigade.
    • At least 11 Malian security forces members killed and at least 8 injured.
    • 2 MINUSMA peacekeepers killed and at least 7 injured.
    • 6 French soldiers injured and 3 civilians killed.
  • Number of attacks per region:
    • Kidal Region: 5
    • Timbuktu Region: 6
    • Gao Region: 4
    • Central Mali: 3
  • October 2016 witnessed worrying development, MUJWA splinter that pledged allegiance to so-called Islamic State in May 2015 claimed two attacks through Mauritania’s news outlet Attacks claimed took place in Niger and Burkina Faso.
  • Niger and Burkina Faso borders area with Mali witnessed at least 4 violent attacks related to VEOs.

FULL PDF REPORT: October Monthly Tracker 2016 for Mali

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Niger: Country with limited resources facing neighbors spillover

By Rida Lyammouri

October 10th, 2016

“The whole population of Niger is at shock after Tazalit attack,” said Malian refugee in Niger. Malians fled Mali to find safety in Niger, but it’s challenging for a country with no resources and capabilities, and facing violence spillover from neighboring countries. After Bosso attack not too long ago, Niger yet again is at shock and at a moment of sadness. While Niger managed to contain at some level domestic violence related to violent extremist organizations (VEOs), could not keep VEOs from penetrating its territories. Both incidents, Bosso and Tazalit, were a result of an insurgency occurring in a neighboring country. Images below show another sad moment of innocent Nigerien security forces buried as a result of a conflict in a neighboring country.

Niger witnessed yet again a deadly attack by suspected jihadists on 06 October 2016, and this time in Tahoua Region. The attack was reportedly targeted Nigerien forces post at Tazalit refugee camp. Nigerien Prime Minister confirmed the incident and that at least 22 Nigerien security members were allegedly brutally executed by bullets to the head, including 14 National Guards, 5 Gendarmes, and 3 Soldiers. Five other officers were injured while only three survived the attack. Aggressors appeared well informed and knew where security post is located. The attackers reported to be around 40, and conflicting reports speaking Arabic and Tamasheq [Tuareg language]. During the attack weapons were seized, as well as ammunition, three vehicles, and one ambulance.

As of 10 October no group claimed responsibility and difficult to identify who is behind the attack. The area is on the borders with Ménaka Region, northern Mali where different groups have operated and occupied since 2012. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) might appear the main suspect but since 2012 the group have been weakened and witnessed major division among its leadership. While seems unlikely to have the capacity to carry such a deadly attack in Niger, MUJWA have demonstrated during previous attacks [see timeline below] its ability to penetrate Nigerien territory and appear to be very familiar with the area.

History of attacks, familiarity with the area, and local recruitment carried in the area suggest MUJWA is the strongest suspect behind this attack. Remaining MUJWA members have been quiet for over a year but this should not lead to the conclusion that is not operational. For instance, several violent attacks against Malian, Foreign, and armed groups forces took place in Mali near Nigerien borders and were never claimed by any VEO. Jihadist groups in the Sahel demonstrated are patient and willing to keep low profile then carry spectacular attacks when least expected. Take for instance Ansar al-Din in Mali; the group barely made headlines after the French intervention in January 2013. As of today, Ansar al-Din is the deadliest jihadist group in Mali and has expanded its area of operations. Another example al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), almost disappeared then resurfaced claiming attacks beyond northern Mali in Bamako, and beyond Mali for the first time in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and Grand Bassam, Cote d’Ivoire. Thus it will be immature to say MUJWA is out of the equation.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahroui men are the other two suspects. Al-Sahroui men, MUJWA splinter, pledged allegiance to so-called Islamic State (IS) in May 2015, carried and claimed its first attack last month in Burkina Faso near the borders with Mali and Niger. Al-Sahraoui was quick at claiming the Burkina Faso attack, so why not this one, especially with the number of casualties among Nigerien forces and the incident got more coverage? The same could be said about AQIM “ghost” brigade al-Nasser, it has been quiet and unclear why would not claim such spectacular attacks.

Despite who is behind Tazalit incident, the attack highlights the concern Niger is facing in regions other than Diffa and southeast area in general. Niger was repeatedly praised for being able to contain domestic conflicts that were aggravated post Libya revolution in 2011. However the country did not escape sporadic attacks in different parts of the country. As the timeline of attacks below shows, Niger experienced attacks in almost all regions that resulted important number of casualties.

Niger Regions Tahoua and Tillabery have been facing major security concerns despite that VEOs never held strong bases at any of these areas. For instance MUJWA was content to show no intention at establishing bases in Niger but willing to demonstrate its operational abilities penetrating and carrying attacks on Nigerien soil. Similar could be said about AQIM that have been using Nigerien territory to conduct operations as far as the capital Niamey.

Niger is surrounded by countries facing political and religious insurgencies and lacks the resources and capabilities to protect its territory. While it remains unclear which group is behind Tazalit attack, Niger is most likely to continue to be a fallback for VEOs facing pressure in neighboring countries to carry spectacular attacks. These attacks have different goals: to seize weapons and to remain popular to local population for recruitment purposes.

Timeline of Attacks on Niger: Tillabery, Tahoua, and Agadez Regions

On 11 September 2016 unknown gunmen carried an attack on Nigerien security post at Tabarey Barey refugee camp just outside Ayorou. As a result two civilians and one Nigerien soldier injured. No group claimed responsibility.

On 17 March 2016 unidentified gunmen attacked a Nigerien gendarmerie post. Three gendarmes were killed, and no group claimed responsibility and it’s an area where different groups could be responsible, including former MUJAO men under Adnane Abu Walid al-Sahraoui, al-Murabitoun of AQIM under Belmokhtar, or members of Ansar al-Din South brigade. This one attack demonstrates how little is known about the area and group’s operating there.

On 28 April 2016 unknown militants killed one policeman was and injured two in Tahoua Region in an unknown location few miles from the borders with Mali.

On 19 November 2014 suspected members of MUJWA entered Niger from Mali and carried an attack Bani Bangou town, Tillabery Region. The attack targeted Gendarmerie post at the exit of the town. One Nigerien security officer killed and two injured.

On 30 October 2014 unknown gunmen carried complex attack in Tillabery Region. Three attacks were conducted almost simultaneously on Mangaize Refugee Camp, a prison in Ouallam, and a Nigerien security patrol. All attacks took place in Tillabery Region. As a result nine members of Nigerien security forces killed.

On 23 May 2013 Belmokhtar men carried simultaneous attacks in Agadez and Arlit, Agadez Region. Attacks targeted Uranium facility in Arlit and military base in Agadez. As a result at least 24 Nigerien security members killed.

Mali: Analysis with Unseen Images of Ansar al-Din Macina Brigade in Central Mali

By Rida Lyammouri

October 5th, 2o16

This report, however, includes unseen images and screenshots of Macina brigade high quality video after Nampala attack. For the first time Sahel MeMo is providing pictures of Macina fighters and important amount of weapons seized from Malian Army in Nampala July 19th.

Mali: Analysis with Unseen Images of Ansar al-Din Macina Brigade in Central Mali

Mali: September 2016 Violence Related to AQIM, Ansar al-Din, MUJWA, and Other Security Incidents

By Rida Lyammouri,

October 4th, 2016

September security incidents could be found by clicking on the link below. Also please note the full report is available on PDF:

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Libya: Thoughts on the kidnapping of 2 Italians and 1 Canadian workers at Ghat

Rida Lyammouri

September 27, 2016

There are still no news and more questions asked than answers one week after the kidnapping of two Italians and one Canadian in southwest Libya. Italian government was first to confirm the abduction of two of its citizens while Canadian government confirmed the troubling news almost a week later. The three workers of Ghat airport were reportedly taken while traveling between Ghat and Tahala near the borders with Algeria. Surprisingly they were traveling without adequate security protection despite that the driver might have been armed, but who is not armed in the area?

As of Monday, September 26th no group claimed responsibility leaving room only for speculations and questions. Because of the history of kidnapping for ransoms (KFRs) in the Sahel Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have a strong track record to be considered the main suspect to be indirectly or directly behind the kidnapping. However this will be the first time the group have kidnapped foreign nationals in southwest Libya, an area AQIM mostly used for planning and movement of weapons. Since AQIM emerged a decade ago it relied on KFRs to finance its operations as it reportedly generated close to $100M between 2008 and 2014.

Here are few thoughts on the kidnapping:

  • Most likely hostages still in southwest Libya and has yet to be transferred to preferred areas by AQIM and allies, notably northern Mali where at least four foreign hostages are held.
  • If AQIM is behind Ghat kidnapping, the group likely to seek ransom for their release from Canadian and Italian governments, or the company hostages were working for. This is encouraging for the abductors because both governments reportedly paid ransoms for the release of their citizens held in Mali.
  • Either the operation was directly carried by AQIM or armed

    Image of a traveling vehicle in Northeast Niger, July 2015. Source: Sahel MeMo.

    bandits, the kidnappers appear to be well informed and knew foreign nationals were traveling on Ghat – Tahala route. This is similar to previous kidnappings claimed by AQIM and allies in Mali and Niger where the abductors always knew the exact location of their potential hostages. Not only that, but also able to execute without being captured. For instance abductors knew the house Swiss national was staying at in Timbuktu January 2016 and managed to escape despite presence of Malian and foreign forces in the city. Back in September 2011 abductors knew the exact rooms where humanitarian workers staying at in Tindouf. In November 2011, kidnappers knew there were western tourists staying at hotel al-Afia in Timbuktu.

  • There are several reasons for the delay of claiming responsibility. First the transfer of hostages likely has yet to take place especially if the operation was conducted by armed bandits planning to strike a deal with AQIM or other suiters. Second the abductors might be attempting to reach a safe area which is not as easy as might seem despite instability. Movement of hostages might be challenging due to increased French patrol operations to crackdown on the movement of weapons and fighters with ties to violent extremist organizations (VEOs).
  • If AQIM is behind the kidnapping they would ideally like to move the three hostages to northern Mali where the group still holding at least three foreign hostages. Hostages unlikely to be kept together at the same exact location to avoid loosing all hostages in one rescue mission.
  • Northeast Niger is also an option but is a challenge for two reasons: French and Niger forces frequent surveillance and it’s more challenging in terms of logistics compared to northern Mali.
  • Unlike in Mali and Algeria, AQIM and allies used southwest Libya to plan operations rather than carrying attacks, especially after 2011. For instance In-Amenas attack in Algeria January 2013 then Arlit and Agadez in Niger May 2013 were both planned by Mokhtar Belmokhtar men in southwest Libya.

Mali: From le Movement National de l’Azawad to Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad (MSA) – Images

By Rida Lyammouri

September 5th, 2016

Key members of the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) split from the group and created Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad (MSA). The MSA is an initiative led by two former MNLA figures, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane and Assalat Ag Habi. While Moussa have been active public figure, Assalat on the other hand have kept a low profile and his last appearance was back in April 2012 at Gao airport when the MNLA and other groups seized control of the city. He was accused by pro-Malian media to be behind an attack on Malian security forces checkpoint in Ménaka February 2016, but that was never confirmed.

Ag Habi is also a close figure to Elhadj Ag Gamou and Iyad Ag Ghali, all three were close friends and were key members of 1990s Tuareg rebellion. Ag Habi defected the Malian Army in 2011 to join the MNLA and 2012 Tuareg rebellion. He was reported to have joined platform groups supportive of the Malian government in April 2015 but that was never confirmed. Ag Habi is more known for his military experience because of the years he spent in Libya. He is comfortable speaking in Arabic than in French like most former Malian military officers and commanders.

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Assalat Ag Habi in Gao April 2012. Source: Al-Jazeera.

This division is another outcome during post conflict when influential members within certain community attempt to position themselves. Both Ag Acharatoumane and Ag Habi are key figures within Tuareg clans based in Ménaka region on the borders with Niger, Douassahak and Chamanamas respectively. Thus although MSA claims to represent communities throughout Azawad (northern Mali), this is unlikely to be case because of their limited influence and popularity among other communities.

I will add analysis and more context to this soon. Images below posted Moussa Ag Acharatoumane on 05 September 2016 (Source).