Category Archives: Ansaru

Boko Haram had a busy Ramadan in 2017, which reflected one of the group’s more successful recent thirty-day spans in terms of violence.

July 11, 2017

Boko Haram had a busy Ramadan in 2017, which reflected one of the group’s more successful recent thirty-day spans in terms of violence.

In total, at least thirty-nine different attacks attributed to the group occurred, the highest monthly total this year (although April and January were close). Ramadan started off slow, with just six attacks in the first ten days, before the group engaged in near-daily violence the rest of the time.

Of the thirty-nine attacks, 25 involved suicide bombers – nearly two out of every three incidents. In fact, the number of suicide incidents is the most ever recorded in a one-month span, an indication of the group’s mystifying ability not just to maintain, but even increase, capabilities in this regard.

These attacks included at least 38 total bombers, as 14 incidents involved multiple bombers, with as many as four at once. While many Boko Haram suicide attacks have largely been ineffective recently – confined to the outskirts of urban areas and few casualties, especially of civilians – Ramadan reversed this trend. At least 55 civilians were killed, or more than two per attack (compared to 9 total civilians killed on 13 attacks in May). While casualty counts are difficult to track and impossible to guarantee complete accuracy, it is clear that the lethality to civilians of this type of violence increased (though centering around a few specific incidents, in which the group was able to exploit some security vulnerabilities).

In terms of location, 18 of the total Ramadan incidents occurred in northern Cameroon (predominately in the Mayo Sava department) while 20 were in Borno state, and one in Chad. Half of those in Borno occurred in or on the outskirts of Maiduguri, symbolizing the group’s continued fascination with the movement’s birthplace. Many of these occurred in two primary areas of the city – its eastern and southeastern flanks, a likely indication of the Shekau faction’s responsibility given his group’s purported hideouts in areas to the south and southeast of the Borno state capital (such as Sambisa Forest).

In terms of the factional nature of the violence, it appears the vast majority of recorded incidents over Ramadan likely derive from the Shekau faction. The use of suicide bombers, the targeting of civilians, and the geographic concentration of violence along the Nigeria-Cameroon border and in south-central Borno all point to Shekau’s responsibility.

Nonetheless, the Barnawi faction is reportedly also present in areas of south-central Borno state, and little information emerges from its presumed northern Borno state strongholds around Guzamala and Abadam local government areas (LGAs), so it is difficult to say how operational the group has been recently. The major 24 June 2017 battle with Chadian security forces along some islands in Lake Chad is the clearest indication of a likely Barnawi faction violence (and was later claimed in the Islamic State weekly publication Al Naba), but the majority of the incidents in the dataset more closely correspond to Shekau’s operational methods.

The Shekau faction also followed up its two biggest Ramadan attacks – an invasion of the Jiddari Polo neighborhood in Maiduguri, and an assault on a convoy of vehicles traveling from Maiduguri along Damboa road in which several female police officers were reportedly abducted, with video messaging claiming the incidents, serving to capitalize on the propaganda value of their success. In fact, both incidents represent somewhat of a recent increase of capabilities for a group constantly claimed to be on the decline. The convoy consisted of 200 vehicles and was protected by both the Nigerian army and police, while the Jiddari Polo incident represented Boko Haram’s first “invasion” of Maiduguri in nearly two years (in addition one of its deepest recent penetrations of the city).

These two incidents, combined with the increase in suicide attack lethality and continued indications after Ramadan of sustained capabilities (such as the first suicide attack in Niger in 1.5 years and repeated suicide violence in northern Cameroon), are patent signs that the movement is far from being defeated. In fact, the increased levels of violence targeting Maiduguri since late last year is another indication that events like the “fall” of Sambisa Forest may result in pushing the militants around more than eliminating them, with some of this now coming closer to the Borno state capital. There is an ebb and flow nature to this violence, but it seems the movement has been able to regroup after military pressure in some fashion.

It also begs the question as to how the movement was able to enjoy such success during this month? Boko Haram is still a far cry from what it was a few years ago when it controlled much of Borno state and beyond, but Ramadan 2017 indicates that it is far from a spent force, and rather one capable of constant adaption. The shifts the group made have helped increase the effectiveness of its suicide attacks, while demonstrating a consistent supply of both bombers and explosive materials. Security actors must consider these dynamics and respond with constantly innovate tactics as well – the recent announcement that the University of Maiduguri, a frequent target in past months, will start digging trenches around unfenced parts of the campus is a good start. But as Ramadan 2017 indicated, more measures are needed, and despite some previously positive trends, it will be unwise to relax when it comes to security in the Lake Chad region any time soon.

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Abu Musab al Barnawi: Ideals vs. Reality

By Omar S Mahmood

April 19th, 2017

At the time of the August 2016 split, Abu Musab al-Barnawi and his associates served more in an opposition role, expressing discontent regarding the group’s trajectory or practices, and promising change. Yet like any opposition leader suddenly thrust into power and given decision-making functions, the realities of control contrast to the ideals expressed while in opposition. This common struggle typically results in a degree of pragmatism and moderation on behalf of the opposition candidate, in turn preventing the full implementation of the principles previously advocated. This in turn is a likely explanation for the recent string of incidents involving the Barnawi faction, and a worrying trend for civilians continuing to live in proximity to his forces.

The Abu Musab al-Barnawi faction of Boko Haram has recently been accused of abusing local civilian populations in northeast Nigeria. Food and medical supplies have been looted, civilians have been executed for refusing extortion payments and under suspicion of working for the government, and nearly two dozen young girls have reportedly been kidnapped. Nonetheless, local residents have also acknowledged that the group does not engage in indiscriminate targeting nor seeks to destroy local possession, aspects which have become a hallmark of Abubakar Shekau’s punitive violence towards civilians. Nonetheless, while the faction may not be operating in as predatory a manner as that of Shekau, recent events suggest that the realities of survival have likely begun to triumph over some of the more idealistic notions initially espoused by Barnawi upon his assumption of power back in August 2016.

Based on his messaging, a large part of Barnawi’s discontent revolved around Shekau’s propensity for attacks that resulted in Muslim civilian casualties. Aside from shifting these attack patterns, however, Barnawi’s leadership likely sought to more broadly alter Boko Haram’s operational processes, in a bid to reset group relations with the local civilian populace.

One key issue lies in the targeting of civilians who support vigilante organizations. Barnawi threatened the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), just as Shekau did before him. Nonetheless, it is important to recall that under Shekau the targeting of civilian vigilante forces escalated quickly after their public emergence in mid-2013. Initially restricted to the vigilantes themselves, violence spiraled to indiscriminate attacks on villages where the CJTF had been set up, and eventually to civilians from Borno state at large, with the group deeming all from the state as culpable supporters. While Boko Haram violence prior to this also resulted in civilian deaths, the advent of large-scale attacks aimed at destroying entire villages emerged out of these dynamics. As an illustration of this extension of violence, a 2015 report from Amnesty International described Boko Haram massacres directed at towns with CJTF units like Gwoza and Bama, while others without a vigilante presence were largely spared.

In Barnawi’s messaging, he has made clear that those who participate in a conspiracy against Islam are legitimate targets, and Muslim vigilantes would qualify in this sense, given their close relations with the government. Yet the question remains as to where Barnawi will draw the line – given that vigilantes are so entrenched at this point in the region and rely on the support of many local communities, will those all communities be found guilty by association?

The wholesale targeting of civilians under Shekau did not emerge in a vacuum, but was tied changes in the local environment and a desire to intimidate those supporting the vigilantes. With Barnawi facing the same dynamics and a likely desire to curb the CJTF’s activities, will he be able to continue to stick to his original ideals to avoid Muslim civilian casualties? Or are the recent executions of three civilians under suspicion of working with the government (along with another for refusing to abide by group demands regarding a forced protection tax), more suggestive of the slippery slope Shekau once faced, and reminiscent of his initially limited targeting of just those considered to be informants?

Another big aspect is in terms of recruitment. The rise in civilian soft targeting by Boko Haram in 2013 coincided with an increase in forced recruitment, as resentment spread given Boko Haram’s attacks on the local populace. This chipped away at the sympathy gained following the Nigerian Government’s heavy-handed crackdown on group members in 2009, and resulted in less willing recruits. To address this manpower shortage, the movement increasingly engaged in forced recruitment, with one estimate of as many as to 10,000 young boys abducted over the past three years.

Barnawi promised to end attacks that kill Muslims in the region may have been tied to expectations of increased recruitment, as his movement seeks to end the practice of targeting the same populace from which it hopes to draw membership. Nonetheless, Barnawi’s focus on more large-scale direct engagements with security forces requires a high number of well-trained fighters to be successful, much more so than asymmetric attacks like suicide bombings. In addition, conducting these sorts of attacks will likely will result in a high turnover rate given the increased risk of casualties. For example, the June 2016 attack targeting military structures in Nigerien town of Bosso was a significant short-term success, but also resulted in the death of 55 militants.

While Shekau apparently did not have major qualms about forced recruitment, the increase use of that practice intertwined with addressing a shortfall in willing adherents. In contrast, an initial Barnawi decision to reportedly let some hostages go after a clash with Shekau’s fighters, suggested that he was less apt to rely on such dynamics, falling in line with his overall vision to lessen the pernicious effects of his movement’s struggle on the local Muslim population. But if willing recruitment does not meet required levels, will Barnawi be forced to renegotiate his stance given on-the-ground realities?

The recent abduction of women suggests his group is not as adverse to forced conscription as initially expected (in contrast, some Barnawi’s members have even been surrendering recently – though it is unclear if that involves a daring escape from the group or not). Whether this will eventually extend beyond the hitherto isolated incidents remains to be seen, but the decision to ignore forced conscription when it comes to women, is not an encouraging sign for an eventual spread of that tactic to men as well.

Another aspect concerns preying off the local population, a matter in which the Shekau group has become particularly well versed. Food, medicine, livestock, and other supplies are frequently raided from local populations as a necessity for survival. This predatory relationship flies in the face of Barnawi’s attempts to win the civilian populace back over to his side, but his fighters find themselves living in similar remote rural areas as well, with need for the same basic supplies. Such demands can adjust a prospective no-looting policy, which recent incidents seem to indicate. While not conducted as violently as Shekau, the looting of food and other supplies is an example another a likely ideal being adjusted, as reality sets in for the young factional leader.

Boko Haram proved to be a highly adaptable group under Shekau, responding to shifting dynamics in their operating environment. Yet, while many of these adaptations were effective, they also came at a destructive cost to the local population. As the Barnawi movement faces the prospect of having to make decisions that ensures the survival of his group, will such realities result in a compromise of his ideals, to the detriment of those living in the Lake Chad Basin region? Or will he be able to find a way to maintain a degree of effectiveness, while holding true to his initial messaging? Recent events appear to suggest that while attempting to preserve the latter, the former may be winning out.

Omar S Mahmood is a researcher at ISS in the Peace and Security Programme. Before joining the ISS, Omar worked as an international security consultant focused on the Lake Chad Basin and Horn of Africa regions; a senior analyst for a Washington DC-based consulting firm; and a Peace Corps volunteer in Burkina Faso.

Updated: Rundown of Boko Haram attacks on Bosso, Yébi, Diffa region in last 2 weeks

By Rida Lyammouri

June 4th, 2016 (updated June 10th)

Consequences of recent increased violence in Diffa region by Boko Haram militants:

  • Until May 2016 many villages, including Bosso, were considered safe places to many refugees that fled violence in NE Nigeria, N. Cameroon, and Chad. However, already displaced population were forced to flee several location. For instance, in Yébi, Medecin Sans Frontriere (MSF) was managing a health post that provided assistance to people who had already been displaced—until it was destroyed May 19th attack.
  • From security standpoint, population fleeing villages have left a void and likely made it easier for Boko Haram militants to move easily without being detected and reported.
  • More than 200,000 displaced population settled in Diffa region fleeing Boko Haram violence in NE Nigeria and Niger itself. However Boko Haram recent attacks forced at least 50,000 to relocate to Diffa and even further to Zinder.
  • The Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) released statement on June 4th claiming June 3rd attack on Bosso military post, but not the attacks on civilians at Yébi. Here is a summary of the statement released by ISWAP: “With the help of God, Caliphate soldiers carried a large scale attack with different types of weapons on a military base in Bosso, southeastern Niger where Nigérien and Nigerian soldiers are based. Caliphate soldiers killed at least 35 and injured other 70 from both, Nigérien and Nigerian armies, also seized important amount of weapons before mujahideen safely returned to their base.”
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ISWAP claim of Bosso attack

On May 19th, at least six civilians killed and seven injured when Boko Haram carried an attack on Yébi village, 5km from Bosso, according to Niger’s Army. Reportedly, four of the victims were burned alive and two shot dead. Yébi was one of few villages in the area where local population remained but according to statement posted on Urgence Diffa Facebook page the entire village now is burned. The attack was conducted at night from 10:00pm until 02:30am. Statement also indicated that Nigérien military did not respond until in the morning where they pursued members of Boko Haram. Because of physical damage to the village it was believed that casualties are far more than what Nigérien Army reported. Statement estimated number of casualties to be 23 and expected to increase. Worse, while majority of people were able to flee and hide in the bushes near the village, victims could be mostly women, children, and elders that were unable to escape according to the statement. Numbers are difficult to confirm but what’s alarming is the ability of Boko Haram members to easily conduct such attacks on unprotected civilians and causing such damages.

On May 27th, Nigérien Army clashed with Boko Haram members at Bosso. The attack was launched by large number of Boko Haram members but Nigérien security forces successfully pushed them back. Reportedly, security forces killed around 12 Boko Haram members and seized important amount of equipment according to an army statement. Also three Nigérien soldiers lightly injured. According to a local, the assault started toward the end of the day by 5:30pm and ended around 8:00pm. 

On May 31st, Boko Haram again attacked village Yébi. Reportedly six civilians killed while number of the injured is unknown. Again, Boko Haram again carried the attack at night around 10:00pm and clashes with security forces of Niger lasted until 04:00am. Number of Boko Haram conducted the attack were reportedly around 40.

On June 3rd, Boko Haram launched even larger scale attack on Nigérien Army based in Bosso. Nigérien Defense Ministry stated that more than 100s of Boko Haram members participated in the attack. While reportedly 30 Nigérien and 2 Nigerian soldiers are killed, 67 other soldiers wounded (ISWAP claimed killing 35 and wounding 70), and there are no reported casualties among civilians. This is largely because most of the population have left the village and Bosso is more like a military base today. Boko Haram again launched the attack at night and captured the village of Bosso overnight. Larger Nigérien Army reinforcement arrived the following morning and managed to recapture the village after Boko Haram have already left. According to Aïr-Info Agadez quoting local sources, Boko Haram abandoned the village early in the morning with important amount of arms, tanks, and foodstuff. Same source also stated Boko Haram left with hostages after burning and ransacking public buildings. There are concerns about unknown number of soldiers missing while the faith of civilians fled the attack remains unknown.

This attack on Bosso came three days after Nigérien Defense Minister told BBC reporter that Boko Haram don’t have the capacity to attack security forces of Niger. True that since Boko Haram started conducting attacks in Niger in February 2015 mainly targeted civilians. However now the group demonstrated its ability to carry even more deadly attack on Niger security forces. Niger simply doesn’t have the resources to protect its borders against the spillover of violence not only from Nigeria, but also from Mali and Libya. Coming months are critical for Niger with increased pressure on violent extremist groups operating in Mali, Nigeria, and more importantly on the so-called Islamic State in Libya.

June 5-6, Boko Haram militants and Nigérien Army clashed in Bosso. Mayor told Reuters that Boko Haram seized control of the town while Nigérien government stated later in the day Niger forces were in total control of the village. Local source reported that clashes moved toward a nearby village, Toumour, west of Bosso, and local population is genuinely concerned. Aïr-Agadez posted on its Facebook page confirmed that Boko Haram militants occupy Toumour as well.

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Statement above by Air-Info Agadez claiming Boko Haram militants occupy Toumour, a village located west of Bosso on the way to Diffa.

June 9th:  Village Kablewa was reportedly attacked by armed men around 2am. Although there were no casualties or violence clashes, local witnesses said gunmen seized goods and foodstuff from local stores they robbed.

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Diffa city entrance. Source: Maghreb and Sahel Blog

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Most of displaced population settled in Diffa had to stay outdoors. Source: UNHCR 

Arrest of Ansaru Leader Barnawi Raises Questions About the Group’s Status

By Omar. S.Mahmood 

April 27th, 2016

On April 1st, Nigerian security forces in the central state of Kogi arrested Khalid al-Barnawi, a prominent jihadist figure and presumed leader of the Boko Haram offshoot Ansaru. Despite uncertainty regarding his recent status, Barnawi’s detention is one of the more substantial in the course of Nigeria’s battle against Islamic militancy, and has already began to bear fruit with the arrest of his deputy twelve days later. At the same time, the event also raises questions regarding Ansaru activities in the three years since its last major attack, and its status vis-à-vis Boko Haram.

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Khalid al-Barnawi

Barnawi is a pseudonym for Usman Umar Abubakar, a mid-40s militant from Borno state who served as a founding member of Boko Haram. Barnawi reportedly trained with Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, maintaining “closelinks with Mokhtar Belmokhtar and the organization thereafter. Following his return to Nigeria, Barnawi planned kidnapping operations against foreign nationals, and was allegedly involved in the 2011 bombing at the UN headquarters in Abuja, among other violence. Barnawi was linked to Ansaru’s emergence in January 2012, and following the March 2012 death of founder Adam Kambar, who had also trained Algeria, Barnawi emerged as the sect’s new leader.

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